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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE~ UF CT.AH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CJAYLA ROGERS, 
Def c nrl ant-Av pef la11 t. 
~TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Res pundeH t, 
v. 
DA~IEL ~lICHAEL ROGERS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case Nos. 
10850 and 10851 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants, Gayla and Daniel Rogers, appeal 
from a verdict and judgment of guilty to an information 
charging burglary in the second degree in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §. 76-9-3 (1953). 
1 
DLSPOSITION IN THJ~ LOWER COURT 
. . On March . 2~, 1966, ~1 com plaint was filed in the 
City Court of Brigham City, Utah, charging appellant, 
separately with second degree burglary. The appellanh 
were arraigned by a magistratD on .Jlarch 28, 1966. A 
preliminary hearing was commenced on appellants con. 
solidated cases on April 12, 1966, and continued to Junt 
6, 1966, at which time appellants were bound over liJ 
stand trial as charged. After being duly arraigne<l !u 
district court, trial of the eousolidated cases was com. 
menced October 25, 1966, ending October 28, 1966. Tb8 
jury returned guilty Yerdids as against the appellants 
herein. Judgment was entered uu November 22, 1966, 
at which time Judge Jones issued a certificate of probabl2 
cause for appeal and an undertaking on appeal was duly 
filed; the appellants then brought this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits the convictions of the appellants 
be affirmed and the matter be remitted to the First 
Judicial District Court for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the purpo.ses of this brief, the transcript of the 
Proceedings in connection with the motion to suppress .. 1 f'l f 
will be referred to as "T," whereas the off1cia 1 e 0 
. "R ,, 
the district court will be ref erred to as · 
2 
t)hortly aft(.>l' the cormuencement of the trial in this 
matter, appellants brought a motion to suppress certain 
evidence. rrhe gravamau of their motion being the seizure 
,1f certain lllaterials in contravention of state and federal 
cunstitutiona 1 provisions. 
Attorney for the appellants called Frank P. Jensen 
a~ a witness for purposes of this motion, and out of 
T):e Learillg of the jury. Mr. Jensen testified that on 
March 2:-J, 1%6, he was the manager of a certain laundro-
HWl in Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah. About 
lU :00 p.nr., 011 the night in question, he observed the 
acpellai1t.:-: and another, Frank Doherty, tampering with 
t '1e l'hange making machines on the premises of the 
laundromat (T-3, 4). Becoming suspicious, he called the 
Brigham City Police Department (T-4). Approximately 
fo-e minutes later tw·o police officer.s arrived and accom-
panied "Mr. Jensen into tlre laundromat (T-8). Mr. Jen-
:;en ·stated that a check of the chang·e making machines 
revealed a shortage of coins (T-17, -18). The appellants 
and Doherty, who were still in the laundromat when the 
police entered, ·were taken into custody. 
Officer Jay Herbert, of the Brigham City Police 
Department, was one of the officers who initially in-
vestigated the eomplaint lodged with his department by 
Mr. Jensen. He was at that time accompanied by Officer 
Deloy Nels on ( T-24). After a preliminary investigation 
2t the ~cene of the crime, the appellants were taken into 
custody and transported to the Brigham City Police 
Station. At this time, Officer Herbert initiated steps to 
3 
obtain a search warrant to enable him to dete, · 
1m1ne the 
contents of the appellant\; automobile (T-26). Officer· 
R·obert Hayes was called to the scene and instructed 
. h . . to 
supervise t e impoundmg of the automobile. Althou 
Officer Herbert testified he heard vague state gn 
ment1 
about what was believed to be contained in the aut omo. 
bile, he stated that his course of action was in no wal' 
effected by this inform a tiou ( T-W). Officer Deloy Nei. 
son, when called as a witness, stated he had accompanied 
Officer Herbert to the crime sce11e and returned to the 
Brigham City Police Station with the appellants an<l 
Doherty in custody. He heard nothing concerning any 
items allegedly found in appellant's car prior to tne 
issuance of the search warrant ( T-43). Officer Robert 
Hayes, Brigham City Police Department, was dispatcheri · 
by radio to the scene of the crime at the request of Offiw 
Herbert and upon arrival was told by Herbert to keep 
surveillance over appellant's automobile and supervise 
the impounding and storage by a local motor company 
(T-46). Pursuant to the impounding, Officer Hayes care· 
fully inventoried the contents of the automobile (T-48). 
This was done as a matter of procedure as a protection 
against false accusations of theft (T-36). 
The written inventory prepared by Officer Hayes 
was filed at the end of his shift in the Brigham City 
Police Station ( T-52). He did not disclose to anyone 
officially or otherwise what he had discovered in the 
automobile as a result of this inventory until days later 
(T-51). 
4 
A search warrant was obtained upon the affidavit 
of Officer Herbert and the appellants automobile was 
~earched at approximately S :00 a.ui., March 26, 1966, as 
~.oon as the motor company storing the automobile 
onened for business. The inventory of the items taken 
from the appellant's car pursuant to the execution of 
the search warrant is found in the Records of the First 
District Court as part of the record on appeal. 
The appellant Gayla Rogers and Frank Doherty 
-"ought to establish, at the hearing, that during the time 
they were held in the Brigham City Police Station they 
heard. what they belieYecl to be an electric drill running . 
.. b electric drill was taken from appellant's car by war-
rant. Appellant Daniel Rogers stated he saw an electric 
drill, which hall shortly before been under the front seat 
of his automobile, in the possession of the Brigham City 
Police at the time of his interrogation in the police 
station. Although not clearly shown in the record, appel-
lants and Doherty attempted to establish the seizure of 
l'ertain items from their automobile prior to the issuance 
of the search warrant. 
The record fails to disclose whether appellant's 
motion to suppress the questioned eYidence was denied 
or granted by the trial court. Further, the record is silent 
as to the use of the questioned evidence at trial against 
the appellants. 
A verdict of guilty a·s charged was returned against 
appellants on October 27, 1966. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD DOE8 NOT CONTAIN A SUFpr 
CIENT ],ACTUAL BA8IS TO SUSTAIN APPE~· 
LANTS' ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IN TRIA 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT APPELLANT~". 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
Appellants bring this appeal urging prejudie1
8
: 
error at trial through the court's refusal to grant then , 
motion to supprnss. A stenographic report of the pro. 
ceedings was prepared an<l made part of the appellatt 
record. This transcript, together with the files of tb 
First District Court, comprises the entire record 01 
appeal. Nothing in the record indicates that the motio0 
to ·suppress was in fact denied. Or, assuming denial. 
whether there was an identity between the evidence 
sought to be suppressed and evidence used at trial. To 
run a thread of rationality through appellants' argu· 
ment this court must conjecture and speculate as to . 
certain basic facts and circumstances not contained in 
the record. First, this court must presume that the trial 
court ruled in any manner as to appellants' motion. 
Secondly, a presumption must be entered that the ruling 
was adverse to appellants. The third presumption re· ' 
quires that this court assume the evidence sought to be 
suppressed was in fact employed by the State at tri~. 
The record is silent as to whether this occurred or even 
a·ssuming the questioned evidence to be offered by the , 
State, whether objection was timely made by appellants. 
6 
\r ell est a hlished, i 11 this jurisdiction and others 
throughout the United ::States, is the principle appellate 
!·ourts shall 11ot presume error debors the record. 
In 24A C.J.S. C1imi11al La.ic, § 1183 (1962), it is stated: 
Unl:v matters properly part of a record so 
complete as to enahle the reviewing court intel-
ligently to pass on them may he eonsidered on 
appeal; and in the abse11ce of such record ordin-
arily, the appeal will he dismissed or the judgment 
affirmed. 
hi the same authority, we find the following: 
As a general rule the appellate court, in the 
absence of a showing to the ecntrary, will in-
dulge all reasonable presumptions in favor of the 
corredness of the judgment or rulings of the trial 
court, and \Vill presume that the proceedings had 
in the progress of the cause were regular and free 
from error. In order to overcome such presump-
tion, error must be affirmatively shown by the 
record; and the burden of showing prejudicial 
error is on the party usually accused complaining 
of the error. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1849 
(1961). 
This court has on several occasions been faced 
with assignment of error on appeal not supported by the 
record. In State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 
(1949), appellant urged this eonrt to reverse on the 
ground that the proseC'Ution had made improper state-
ments to the jury during argument. As the argument of 
counsel was not made part of the record, the court would 
not find prejudicial error. See also Schlatter v. McCarty, 
113 Utah 543, 196 P.2d 968 (1948). 
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State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 30i P.2d 887 (l --
f · h · 9v1J m111s es further support for res1J011dent's po ·t· . ' 
• • s1 1011. Or 
that occasion, this court held: · 
In the absence of anr indi('ation of 1·mp . 
t · . ropn. e y, to assume that some irregularitv O('Cl l 
h. h . · lrTP1 w IC prevented the defen<la11 ts from hav· "· 
f • • 1 1 
• )11~ I 
air tna , wou d reqmre ns to indulge in co ~ . 
t Th. . . l1Je1. ure. is is neither warranted under the eircu '. 
t . l . m s ances, nor wit m1 our prerogative should 're 
desire to do so. (6 Ftah 2d at lW.) 
Respondent further urges tl1is eourt that by virtue 
of prior decisions in this jurisdictiou not only must 
appellants affirmatively demonstrate error on the record 
I 
but that in the absence of this affirmative showing thii 
court must indulge all reasonable presumptions in faYor 
of the judgment and presume the proceedings were regu-
lar and fre-e from error. Be1111ett Leasi11g Co. v. Elliso11, 
15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d §24G (1963); State v. Hamilto11, 
18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966). Similar views have 
obtained in California and Idaho. People v. Wilkins, 16~ 
C.A.2d 27, 336 P.2d 540 (1959); State v . .Mundell, 66 
Idaho 297, 158 P.2d 818 (1945); State v. Lcavitt,44Idaho 
739, 260 Pac. 164 (1927). 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS' AUTOMOBILE \VAS NOT SUB· 
JECTED TO AN ILLEGAL SI~ARCH NOR WAS 
PROPERTY UNLA vVFULL Y SEIZED. 
8 
Jssuming arguendo, but not conceding support for 
appellants' eontentions in the record, respondent sub-
mits that the actions Df the police authorities were en-
iircly proper. The transcript of the testimony at appel-
lants' motion to suppress fairly supports a finding by 
the lower court that the search pursuant to the execution 
of thr> search warrant was in no way tainted or influenced 
by what appellants regard as the illegal search by way 
of the impounding officer's inve11tory. It is undisputed 
on the re(·ord that Officer Herbert, when he took the 
appellants into custody and proceeded toward the police 
station, rntentled at that time to obtain a search warrant. 
The transcript shows the following question asked 
Officer Herbert and his response,: 
Q. "\Yhen had you decided, as an officer, to at-
tempt to obtain a search warrant? 
A. ••This decision was made while I was leaving 
the scene, taking the people to the police sta-
tion. I at first was going to make a search of 
the automobile there. But then I decided that 
this was wrong, and knew that I would have to 
have a search warrant. (T-26) 
During the time the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant was being prepared by the City Attorney at the 
request of Officer Herbert, the unrelated inventory of 
Officer Hayes was taking place (T-29). This inventory 
played no part in the activities to obtain the warrant 
(T-29). What appellant must do to put his case under 
the rationale of the United States Supreme Court cases 
cited in his brief is establish a casual relationship be-
9 
tween the alleged unla ,vful inn~ntorv and b 
. • su seque11t 
not prior or contemporary, actiYity to obtaiii ·' 
, . . ' a search 
warrant (Benettt v. United States, 97 F.2d 263 (9th C:. 
1938). The necessary casual rcla ti on between tl 
1
:· 
le a1· 
leged illegal activity and the evidence solwht to b 
1:1 e ex. 
eluded in this case is lacking ( lrayne v. United State 
318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
,1, 
In 1963, the United States t;upreme Court estab. 
lished a test to be used in determining to what degret 
courts must pursue the ''fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine in vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. 
Justice Brennan, in delivering the opinion of the Court 
in Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963), stated: 
"\Ve need not hold that all evidence is "fruitoi 
the poisonous tree'' simply because it would no; 
have come to light but for the illegal actions of the 
police. Rather, the more apt question in such a 
ca·se is ''whether granting establishment of the 
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploita· 
tion of that illegality or instead by means suffi. 1 
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the pri-
mary taint.'' Maguire, E ridence of Guilt, 221 
(1959·). 
Justice Holmes, in Silverthorne Lurnber v. U.S., 251 
U.S. 385 (1920), reasoned: 
The essence of a provision forbidding the ac-
quisition of evidence in a certain way is that not 
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used be· 
fore the court but that it shall not be used at all. 
Of course thi~ does not mean that the facts thus 
10 
obtaiued are sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge 
of them is gained from an independent source they 
may be proved like any others ... 251 U.S. at 392. 
The prin<'.iples enunciated in Wong Swn and Silver-
thorne (siipra) are further applied in Parts Mfg. Co-rp. 
, .. L.lfnch. 1:29 F.2d 841, 143 A.L.R. 132 (2nd Cir. 1942), 
cert. den., 311 U.S. 674 (1942); Coplon v. U.S., 191 F.2d 
i49 (1951), cert. den., 342 U.S. 926 (1951); and Wagman 
v. Arnold, 251 F.2d 272 (2nd Cir. 1958). Interesting and 
authoritative textual treatment of the matter may be 
found in Davis, Federal Searches and Seizures, 335 
1)964), and Maguire, How To Unpoisun the Fruit - The 
Fourth Amendment and the Excl1isionary Rule, 55 J. 
Crim L., Crim. and P.S. 307 (1964). 
It becomes clear, therefore, that the seizure of the 
evidence from appellants' automobile was predicated 
upon the execution of a valid search warrant. The inven-
tory of Officer Hayes was nothing more than an unre-
lated procedure instituted and motivated by personal 
rather than professional reasons. 
Clearly the source of the information used to obtain 
the search \Varrant was independent of any gained 
through the inventory and is sufficiently distinguishable 
to be purged of taint. 
CONCLUSION 
.Appellant's are before this Court with a record so 
incomplete as to merit no consideration by this Court. 
11 
Notwithstanding, granting appellants the factual e\·" 
~nts 
as outlined in their brief, their argument must of nee _ 
e~-
si ty fail. The r1ecord is replete \rith ample evidence w!ii! 
which to find independent and unrelated activity 011 th" 
part of the police officers. The procedures were fair anu 
the verdict just. The judgme11t should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
1Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
12 
